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Anatomo-clinical and neuroimaging data show that the left fronto-parietal areas play an
important role in representing tools. As manipulation is an important source of knowledge
about tools, it has been assumed that motor activity explains the link between tool
knowledge and the left fronto-parietal areas. However, controversies exist over the exact
mechanisms underlying this relationship. According to a strong version of the “embodied
cognition theory,” activation of a tool concept necessarily involves re-enactment of the
corresponding kind of action. Impairment of the ability to use tools should, therefore,
lead to impairment of tool knowledge. Both the “domains of knowledge hypothesis”
and the “sensory-motor model of conceptual knowledge” refute the strong version of
the “embodied cognition hypothesis” but acknowledge that manipulation and other action
schemata play an important role in our knowledge of tools. The basic difference between
these two models is that the former is based on an innate model and the latter holds
that the brain’s organization of categories is experience dependent. Data supporting and
arguing against each of these models are brieﬂy reviewed. In particular, the following lines
of research, which argue against the innate nature of the brain’s categorical organization, are
discussed: (1) the observation that in patientswith category-speciﬁc disorders the semantic
impairment does not respect the boundaries between biological entities and artifact items;
(2) data showing that experience-driven neuroplasticity in musicians is not conﬁned to
alterations of perceptual and motor maps but also leads to the establishment of higher-
level semantic representations for musical instruments; (3) results of experiments using
previously unfamiliar materials showing that the history of our sensory-motor experience
with an object signiﬁcantly affects its neural representation.
Keywords: tools representation, left fronto-parietal areas, embodied cognition theory, domains of knowledge
hypothesis, innate theories, sensory-motor experiences, sensory-motor model of conceptual knowledge
INTRODUCTION
Tools constitute a very important and very speciﬁc category of
objects, which includes the man-made artifacts that have driven
the transition from the prevalence of biological, innate factors to
the prevalence of cultural determinants in the development of the
human mind (Vaesen, 2012; Lefebvre, 2013). For this reason, the
problem of speciﬁc aspects of the cognitive and neural bases of
human tool use must be viewed in the context of the wider prob-
lem of the cognitive and neural bases of categories in general. In
the l980s, Warrington and colleagues laid the groundwork for a
contemporary approach to this problem. In an inﬂuential series
of papers, these authors showed that different brain lesions can
provoke different kinds of category-speciﬁc disorders which selec-
tively affect action names/verbs (Baxter and Warrington, 1985;
McCarthy and Warrington, 1985), biological entities (Warrington
and Shallice, 1984; McCarthy and Warrington, 1991), and man-
made artifacts (Warrington and McCarthy, 1983, 1987). However,
to explain these category-speciﬁc disorders they did not claim that
various categories of knowledge are separately represented at the
brain level. Rather, they proposed a general principle (i.e., the“dif-
ferentialweighting hypothesis”),which, onone side, acknowledges
that concepts are based on the convergence of different perceptual
and motor information in speciﬁc cortical areas but, on the other
side, stresses the different weight that various sources of knowl-
edge can have in the acquisition of different conceptual categories.
According to this principle, category-speciﬁc semantic disorders
result from disruption of the brain structures underlying percep-
tual, motor and language-related sources of knowledge, which
have a critical role in organizing the corresponding categories.
Within this context, category-speciﬁc disorders for verbs are con-
sidered due to disruption of the semantic aspects of actions and
the dissociation (in objects) between living beings and artifacts
is considered the consequence of the different weight of visual-
perceptual and functional attributes in the construction of living
and artifact categories (the “sensory-functional theory”). More
speciﬁcally, this model suggests that the brain networks which are
damaged in category-speciﬁc semantic disorders for animal and
plant-life items have a critical role in processing the high-level
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visual attributes which allow distinguishing members of the “bio-
logical” categories. On the other hand, the cortical areas that are
disrupted in patients with a prevalent defect for tools and other
artifacts are involved in processing the functional and manip-
ulative functions on which the knowledge of artifacts is based
(Gainotti, 2000,2005; BuxbaumandSaffran,2002; Buxbaumet al.,
2007).
Warrington and colleagues’ positions were at variance with
cognitive models (e.g., Pylyshyn, 1973; Fodor, 1975; Caramazza
et al., 1990; Patterson and Hodges, 2000) that proposed the exis-
tence of a unitary, abstract and amodal semantic system. The
latter was accessed by the highest levels of the various perceptual
modalities (i.e., “structural descriptions”), which include a com-
plete perceptual speciﬁcation of objects prior to their meaningful
recognition. According to these cognitive models, there should
be no trace of the various sensory-motor modalities beyond the
level of the corresponding “structural descriptions,” because the
format of semantic representations should be symbolic, abstract,
amodal and propositional. On the other hand, some reviews of
the anatomical correlates of category-speciﬁc disorders for liv-
ing beings and artifacts were consistent with Warrington and
colleagues’ interpretations: ﬁrst, those by Saffran and Schwartz
(1994) and by Gainotti et al. (1995) and, subsequently, in a more
detailed manner, by Gainotti (2000) and Capitani et al. (2003).
Indeed, all these reviews showed that in patients with category-
speciﬁc semantic disorders for living beings lesions bilaterally
affect the anterior parts of the temporal lobes, where the ventral
stream of visual processing terminates (Ungerleider and Mishkin,
1982; Mishkin et al., 1984; Goodale et al., 1991); but in patients
with impaired knowledge of tools and other artifacts, the lesions
encroach upon the inferior parts of the left frontal and parietal
lobes, which process action and somato-sensory data. The impor-
tance of the inferior parts of the left frontal and parietal lobes in
tool representation was supported by the anatomo-clinical data of
Buxbaum et al. (2000) and Buxbaum and Saffran (2002) and the
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiments con-
ducted by Kellenbach et al. (2003) and Boronat et al. (2005). The
ﬁrst authors showed that the expression “functional attributes,”
which should characterize artifacts, includes heterogeneous com-
ponents. They, indeed, distinguished the function of an object
from its manipulation and suggested that because “manipulation”
is related to a sensory-motor activity it might be the compo-
nent most tightly linked to the “differential weighting hypothesis.”
Kellenbach et al. (2003) and Boronat et al. (2005) conﬁrmed this
hypothesis by asking normal subjects in two fMRI studies to make
judgments about actions and functions associated with manipu-
lable and non-manipulable objects. Both studies showed that the
left inferior frontal and parietal areas responded more strongly to
actions (vs functions) and to manipulable (vs non-manipulable)
objects. Therefore, these results conﬁrmed that brain regions spe-
cialized for sensory-motor functions have a critical role in the
representation of tools and other manmade objects. This, obvi-
ously, does not mean that tools are represented only in action
linked left fronto-parietal cortical areas, because some authors
(e.g., Lewis, 2006 and Frey, 2007) have rightly noted that this sys-
tem must interact, within a “tool use network,” with an other
more general system, involved in conceptualizing, planning, and
accessing knowledge associated with tool use. According to Frey
(2007), this interaction should involve, on one hand, sensory-
motor knowledge, represented within the dorsal stream of visual
processing (Goodale et al., 1991) and, on the other hand, semantic
knowledge, represented, at least in part, within the ventral stream.
An alternative model, advanced by proponents of the “Semantic
Hub” hypothesis (e.g., Patterson et al., 2007; Lambon Ralph and
Patterson, 2008), assumes that this more general semantic net-
work should be bilaterally located in the anterior portions of the
temporal lobes, which are atrophic in Semantic dementia (SD).
Hodges et al. (2000) have indeed, shown that in patients with SD
naming, semantic knowledge and use of tools can be markedly
impaired. The present review, however, will not dwell on this
problem, because it will be focused on the speciﬁc issue of the
mechanisms underlying the crucial role of the left fronto-parietal
areas in the representation of tools and not on the general prob-
lem of the cortical network underlying tools representation. As
a matter of fact, according to the “Semantic Hub” hypothesis, a
bilateral atrophy of the anterior temporal lobes should provoke a
semantic impairment, more or less equally affecting all kinds of
concepts. No speciﬁc interaction should, therefore, be predicted
between the “semantic hub” and the speciﬁc left fronto-parietal
cortical representation of the tools category.
Controversies over the mechanisms underlying the crucial role
of the left fronto-parietal areas in the representation of tools can
be viewed, from a very general point of view, as a “tool” spe-
ciﬁc version of some of the oldest controversies in neuroscience:
that between nature and nurture as well as that between local-
ization principle, emphasizing the speciﬁcity and modularity of
the brain on the one hand and holistic views, stressing uniﬁed,
global functions and Gestalt phenomena on the other hand (see
also Edelman, 1993 and Tononi et al., 1998). The present review
highlights strength and weaknesses of three accounts which have
tried to explain the relationships between tool knowledge, manip-
ulation and left frontal and parietal areas, following the lines of
thought illustrated in this introduction.
MODELS ADVANCED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN MANIPULATION AND TOOL KNOWLEDGE
Different theoretical models have been advanced to explain the
relationship between manipulation and tool knowledge and the
role played by the left ventral frontal and parietal areas. One of
these interpretations is based on a strong version of the “embod-
ied cognition hypothesis” (Barsalou, 1999; Barsalou et al., 2003;
Gallese and Lakoff, 2005) and maintains that the conceptual pro-
cessing of tools necessarily involves the retrieval or simulation
of the movements associated with tool usage. According to these
views, motor programs are run in the course of object recognition
and are necessary to ground conceptual knowledge of objects.
One prediction that can be made on the basis of this hypothesis
is that loss or impairment of motor programs concerning the use
of tools should be associated with disruption of the correspond-
ing conceptual tool knowledge. This “strong version,” however, is
not the only account of the embodied cognition theory, because a
weaker version, simply stressing the importance of manipulation
and other action schemata in our knowledge of tools, is deﬁnitely
accepted by most authors and because some representatives of the
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embodied cognition theory (e.g., Barsalou, 2008), seem to separate
themselves from the rigid view that has been just described.
Other theoretical models therefore acknowledge that motor
programs associated with tool use have an important role in the
construction of tool representation, but deny that a necessary and
sufﬁcient relationship exists between the re-enactment of these
sensory-motor processes and tool knowledge.
One of these models is the “domains of knowledge”hypothesis,
proposed by Caramazza (1998); Caramazza and Shelton (1998),
Capitani et al. (2003) and Caramazza and Mahon (2003). This
model acknowledges that conceptual knowledge is organized in
categories at the brain level and holds that innate (rather than
experience-dependent) factors subsume this categorical organiza-
tion. It also assumes that natural selection produced specialized
and therefore dissociable neural circuits for animals, “fruit and
vegetables,” tools and “conspeciﬁcs,” because these categories have
an important and speciﬁc role in human survival (Caramazza
and Mahon, 2003). One development of this model, called “the
distributed domain-speciﬁc hypothesis” (Mahon and Caramazza,
2011), argues that innately determined patterns of connectivity
mediate the integrationof information critical for the organization
of each domain of knowledge.
A different theoretical model, which acknowledges the impor-
tant (but not exclusive) role of speciﬁc motor programs in the
construction of tool representation, is the “sensory-motor model
of conceptual knowledge” (Saffran and Schwartz, 1994; Gainotti
et al., 1995; Chao et al., 1999; Chao and Martin, 2000; Gain-
otti, 2000, 2005; Martin et al., 2000; Martin and Chao, 2001;
Martin, 2007). This model holds that various perceptual, motor
and encyclopedic sources of knowledge have different weights in
the construction of different living and artifact categories and
attributes their role to experience-dependent (rather than innate)
factors. Data supporting and contrasting each of these models will
be brieﬂy discussed in the following sections of this review.
DATA SUPPORTING AND CONTRASTING THE “STRONG” VERSION OF
THE “EMBODIED COGNITION THEORY”
As a general rule, data supporting the “strong” version of the
“embodied cognition theory” come from functional neuroimag-
ing experiments, whereas data weakening or undermining this
theory come from the ﬁeld of brain pathology. Several authors
have documented that the left inferior frontal and parietal areas
are selectively activated when subjects perform tasks with tool
stimuli but not with non-manipulable objects (see Grèzes and
Decety, 2001; Martin and Chao, 2001 and Caramazza and Mahon,
2006 for reviews). Other authors (e.g., Hauk et al., 2004; Buccino
et al., 2005; Tettamanti et al., 2005; Kemmerer et al., 2008; Pulver-
muller et al., 2009; Arévalo et al., 2012) have shown that amore ﬁne
grained relationship exists between actions performed with tool
stimuli and activation of speciﬁc frontal and parietal areas. Indeed,
when normal subjects are presented with stimuli involving actions
that refer to speciﬁc body parts (such as objects associated with the
use of the hand, mouth or foot), activation prevails in the corre-
sponding somatotopically organized cortical areas. Therefore, the
activation peak for each effector correspondswith the somatotopic
organization of the motor homunculus, which was ﬁrst described
by Penﬁeld and Boldrey (1958).
Critics of these ﬁndings (e.g., Fischer and Zwaan, 2008; Aré-
valo et al., 2012) noted that: (a) functional neuroimaging evidence
showing thatmotor programs participate in verbal and non-verbal
tool knowledge does not imply that these action schemata are
necessary or sufﬁcient to support tool processing; (b) the somato-
topical distribution of activations observed in the fMRI studies is
not always clear and a goodmatch for all three effectors across tasks
is rarely reported (Fernandino and Iacoboni, 2010; Kemmerer and
Gonzalez-Castillo, 2010).
Furthermore, lesion data, which are more relevant to clar-
ify whether the activated areas are necessary for grounding tool
conceptual knowledge or simply participate in their process-
ing, have provided results inconsistent with the strong version
of the “embodied cognition theory.” Thus, research on patients
with apraxia, whose performance is impaired when imitating
observed actions, using objects or pantomiming their use from
visual presentation, has shown that the ability to use objects may
be differentially impaired relative to naming objects or knowing
their function (Buxbaum et al., 2000; Buxbaum and Saffran, 2002;
Rosci et al., 2003; Negri et al., 2007). Garcea et al. (2013) reported
the detailed study of a patient with a large left hemisphere lesion
whose object knowledge was relatively spared in spite of a severe
motor (actionproduction) defect and impaired conceptual knowl-
edge of actions. Arévalo et al. (2012) presented left hemisphere
stroke patients with pictures and words representing objects and
actions typically associated with use of the hand, mouth and foot.
They correlated results obtained on these tasks with data obtained
from voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping analyses, but found
no support for a correlation between body parts involved in the
use of objects and somatotopically organized locus of damage.
Taken together, the few studies that have used lesion data to test
predictions deriving from the “embodied cognition theory” have
provided data inconsistent with this theory. In keeping with these
conclusions, based on the comparison between results of func-
tional neuroimaging experiments and of anatomo-clinical studies,
are also more general considerations. If we take into account, for
instance, the automatic perception of object affordances (namely
the fact that the action representations of an object can be auto-
matically activated from its view) we must acknowledged that this
automaticity is not consistent with the attainment of tool identity
from action representations (Creem-Regehr and Lee, 2005). Con-
trasting opinions exist, however, on this subject. Some authors
(e.g., Bub et al., 2008) suggest that that activation of motor rep-
resentations depends on a form of attentional orienting to the
object. Other authors (e.g., Randerath et al., 2013) propose that
there are limitations to the automatic perception of affordances,
because factors such as tool use context, and type of task play an
inﬂuential role. Finally, it must be noted that the “strong version”
of the embodied cognition theory entails a none or all mechanism,
which render the model rather implausible.
DATA SUPPORTING “INNATE” AND “EXPERIENCE-DEPENDENT”
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
MANIPULATION AND TOOL KNOWLEDGE
Both the “domains of knowledge hypothesis” and the “sensory-
motor model of conceptual knowledge” refute the strong version
of the “embodied cognition hypothesis” but acknowledge that
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manipulation and other action schemata have an important role
in our knowledge of tools. The basic difference between these two
models is that the “domains of knowledge hypothesis” is based on
an innatist model and the “sensory-motor model of conceptual
knowledge” maintains that the brain’s organization of categories
is experience-dependent.
In fact, the “domains of knowledge” hypothesis’ holds that the
brain is really organized by categories and that this organization
results from innately determined patterns of connectivity which
mediate the integration of information critical for each category.
On the contrary, the “sensory-motor model of conceptual knowl-
edge” holds that the categorical organization of the brain is only
apparent because each category results from the convergence of
different sources of knowledge whose organization is not innate
but experience-dependent. According to theﬁrstmodel,whichwas
labeled “the distributed domain-speciﬁc hypothesis” by Mahon
and Caramazza (2009), a domain-speciﬁc neural system is a net-
work of brain regions in which each region processes a different
type of sensory, motor, affective or conceptual information about
the same category of objects. Furthermore, the computations that
must be performed on items in the same category are sufﬁciently
speciﬁc to merit a specialized process. For instance, there is a
strong need to integrate motor-relevant information with visual
information for tools and other artifacts; this need is less strong
for animals and faces. In a similar manner, there is a strong need to
integrate affective information, biological motion processing and
visual form information for animals and conspeciﬁcs; this need
is less strong for tools and other artifacts. Thus, supporters of
the “distributed domain-speciﬁc hypothesis”propose that special-
ization for faces in the lateral fusiform area of the ventral visual
stream occurs because this region of the brain is connected with
the amygdale and the superior temporal sulcus, which are impor-
tant for the extractionof socially relevant information. By contrast,
specialization for tools and manipulable objects is driven by con-
nectivity between the inferior frontal and parietal cortex, which
subserve object manipulation and regions of the medial fusiform
gyrus, which are involved in tools visual processing. Data support-
ing the innate nature of these patterns of connectivity come from
work indicating that congenitally blind subjects show activation
for words (presented in Braille) in the same regions of the ventral
stream activated by visually presented words in sighted individu-
als (Buchel et al., 1998). Furthermore, Mahon et al. (2009) showed
that the same medial-to-lateral bias in category preferences for
artifacts vs animals which is present in the ventral surface of the
temporo-occipital cortex in sighted individuals is also present in
congenitally blind subjects. Mahon and Caramazza (2011) sug-
gested that if visual experience is unnecessary for the emergence
of category-speciﬁcity in the ventral stream, innate connectivity
between regions of the ventral stream and other regions of the
brain could drive category-speciﬁcity.
Nevertheless, some data argue against the “domains of knowl-
edge hypothesis” and the innate nature of the brain’s categorical
organization. Among these, we can include the following clinical
and experimental data:
(a) The observation that in patients with category-speciﬁc dis-
orders the semantic impairment does not respect the boundaries
between living/biological entities and non-living/artifact items.
In particular, Warrington and Shallice (1984); Warrington and
McCarthy (1987), Basso et al. (1988); Silveri and Gainotti (1988);
Damasio (1990), Hillis and Caramazza (1991); Sacchett and
Humphreys (1992), Breedin et al. (1994); Farah et al. (1996), Forde
et al. (1997), Dixon et al. (2000) and Masullo et al. (2012) showed
that the representation of “body parts” tends to be disrupted in
association with that of artifacts, and the representation of “musi-
cal instruments” tends to be disrupted in association with that
of biological entities. For two reasons, this observation is consis-
tent with the “sensory-functional theory” and inconsistent with
the “domains of knowledge hypothesis.” On one side, we observe
here a systematic breakdown across categories. On the other side,
musical instruments (which are not recognized by their function
but by their different shape and acoustic features) are more simi-
lar to “living” items than to other artifacts from the viewpoint of
their sources of knowledge, whereas body parts are identiﬁed on
the basis of the somato-sensory and action-related information,
which also has a critical role in the recognition of tools and other
artifacts (Gainotti et al., 2009).
(b) Still within the category of musical instruments (but shift-
ing from the contrast between the disruption of real categories
and the disruption of representations based on the same sources
of knowledge to the“innate vs experience-dependent”opposition),
interesting data supporting the experience-dependent interpreta-
tion were recently reported by Hoenig et al. (2011). These authors,
starting from the premise that professional musicians consti-
tute a very good model for understanding experience-dependent
plasticity in the human brain, wondered whether this neuroplas-
ticity might extend beyond basic perceptual and motor functions
and shape the semantic representation of musical instruments.
Using fMRI, they showed that in musicians (but not in musical
laypersons) conceptual processing of visually presented musical
instruments activates the auditory association cortex encompass-
ing the right posterior superior temporal gyrus, which is also
recruited in the auditory perception of real sounds. Therefore,
experience-driven neuroplasticity in musicians is not conﬁned to
alterations of perceptual and motor maps but also leads to the
establishment of higher-level semantic representations formusical
instruments.
(c) The role of prior motor experience in the cortical repre-
sentation of objects was also addressed by Creem-Regehr et al.
(2007); Kiefer et al. (2007), Weisberg et al. (2007) and Bellebaum
et al. (2013). As the history of previous sensory-motor experience
with familiar objects cannot be controlled, these authors tried to
use previously unfamiliar material and submitted their subjects to
different types of extensive training with these objects. In Kiefer
et al.’s (2007) study, the plasticity of conceptual representations
was assessed by training subjects with novel objects under different
training conditions. In one class of stimuli, object categorization
was based on a detail feature of the novel objects, affording a par-
ticular action. During training, participants were asked either to
make an action pantomime toward the detail feature or simply to
pay attention to it, by pointing to it with their index ﬁnger. Only in
the pantomime group an early activation was found in the frontal
areas, whereas in the pointing training group this effect was absent.
These results show that action information contributes to concep-
tual processing, depending on the speciﬁc learning experience,
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and suggest that conceptual representations are established by the
learning-based formation of cell assemblies in different cortical
areas.
Creem-Regehr et al. (2007) investigated, by means of fMRI,
the inﬂuence of action knowledge associated with viewing, grasp-
ing, and using novel graspable objects. Participants were trained
on complex actions associated with novel objects (“tools”) and
had experience manipulating other visually similar novel objects
(“shapes”). The largest differences between “tools” and “shapes”
were found in using, in which greater effect sizes were observed
for tools versus shapes in the left inferior parietal lobule (IPL), the
pre-supplementary motor cortex (pre-SMA) and, marginally, in
the left ventral premotor cortex (VPM). These results suggest that
representations of tools are constructed on the basis of complex
action schemata, which recruit processes related to graspability,
action plans and use of objects.
Weisberg et al. (2007)used fMRI in subjectswho should visually
match pictures of novel objects before and after extensive training
dealing with the use of these objects to perform speciﬁc tool-like
tasks. After training, neural activity emerged in regions associated
with the motion (left middle temporal gyrus) and manipula-
tion (left intraparietal sulcus and premotor cortex) of common
tools, showing that experience of direct interaction with previ-
ously unfamiliar objects led to new neural object representations
in the same cortical areas underlying the neural representation
of tools. Finally, Bellebaum et al. (2013) studied with fMRI the
impact of different types of object-related sensorimotor experi-
ences on the neural representations of novel objects, contrasting
the manipulation training (MTO) with the visual training (VTO)
and the absence of training (NTO). The post-training activity in
the left inferior/middle frontal gyrus and the left posterior IPL was
higher for MTO than for VTO and NTO suggesting that manipu-
lation experience speciﬁcally yields higher activities in regions of
the fronto-parietal cortex.
(d) The ﬁnal point, which argues against the hypothesis that an
innate connectivity pattern may subsume the categorical orga-
nization of the human brain, is that handedness, rather than
hemispheric language lateralization, seems to account for the spe-
cial role played by the left ventral frontal and parietal areas in
tool knowledge. In the introductory part of this review, I men-
tioned that in category-speciﬁc semantic disorders for livingbeings
lesions affect the anterior parts of the temporal lobes bilaterally
(where highly processed visual data are integrated with other sen-
sory modalities). Differently, in patients with impaired knowledge
of tools and other artifacts, lesions encroach upon the inferior
parts of the left frontal and parietal lobes, which process action
and somatosensory data. A theory stressing the innate aspects
of brain organization and a theory stressing the importance of
experience-dependent factors should make opposite predictions
about the relationships among lateralization of the tool-related
fronto-parietal activation, language lateralization andhandedness.
Innate theories should predict that strongly left-handed subjects
will continue to show left fronto-parietal activation because of the
same genetic factors which subsume the left hemisphere special-
ization for language (Annett, 2000; Corballis, 2009). Experiential
theories should predict right fronto-parietal activation resulting
from the execution of movements with the left side of the body.
Two recent studies were conducted by Lewis et al. (2006) and
Willems et al. (2010) in strong right- and left-handers to evalu-
ate the role played by asymmetries in motor experience and the
left dominance for language on the lateralization of tool represen-
tation. In the ﬁrst study, Lewis et al. (2006) compared the pattern
of cortical activation evoked by hand-manipulated tool sounds
and animal vocalizations and found that tool sounds preferentially
evoke activity in high-level motor-related cortical regions of the
hemisphere opposite to the dominant hand. In the second study,
Willems et al. (2010) used fMRI to compare premotor activity
associated with understanding action verbs (strictly related to tool
use) and showed that right-handers preferentially activated the left
premotor cortex and left-handers, the right premotor areas. There-
fore, in both studies and in agreement with the positions defended
by the theory stressing the importance of experience-dependent
factors, the laterality of cortical regions activated by high-level
action and tool use was related to the side of the body involved in
actions and not to left-hemisphere dominance for language. Note,
however, that in a paper recently published by Goldenberg (2013)
on “apraxia in left-handers” there were three aphasic patients with
pervasive apraxia caused by left-sided lesions, who showed a dis-
sociation of apraxia from handedness. Conversely there were also
three patients with pervasive apraxia caused by right brain lesions
without aphasia, who showed a dissociation of apraxia from apha-
sia. The implications of these data for the problem at issue requires
clariﬁcations.
CONCLUSION
Taken together, results of the present review suggest that neither a
strong version of the“embodied cognition theory”nor an“innate”
categorical organization of conceptual knowledge can account for:
(a) the important role of manipulation and other action schemata
in our knowledge of tools and (b) the links between tool knowl-
edge and the inferior fronto-parietal areas. On the other hand,
the“sensorimotor model of semantic knowledge”can explain data
obtained in brain-damaged patients (showing that tool knowledge
can be spared after disruption of the motor processes engaged
in tool use) and data stressing the role of prior motor experi-
ence in the construction of the cortical representation of objects.
Furthermore, the sensorimotor model of semantic knowledge is
supported by the results of studies that assessed the weight of var-
ious sources of knowledge in the construction of biological and
artifact categories in normal subjects. These studies used either
feature veriﬁcation tasks (e.g., Vigliocco et al., 2004; McRae et al.,
2005) or Likert scales (e.g.,Gainotti et al., 2009,2012;Hoffmanand
LambonRalph, 2013) to evaluate theweight that different“sources
of knowledge”could have in the construction of different semantic
categories. Regardless of the methodology used in these investi-
gations, results showed that visual information is considered the
dominant source of knowledge across categories, but the second
most important sources of information are different in biological
and artifact categories. In fact, they consist of other perceptual data
for the living categories and actions and somato-sensory data for
tools and the other artifact categories. Therefore, vision, actions
and somato-sensory information have a major role in the repre-
sentation of tools and other artifacts, whereas visual and other
perceptual input have a dominant role in the representation of
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animals and other living things. The fact that normal subjects
have considered both vision and action-related information as
important sources of knowledge about tools and other artifacts
supports: (a) the crucial role of the left fronto-parietal areas, sub-
suming transitive actions, in the representation of tools; (b) the
thesis of authors (e.g., Creem-Regehr and Lee, 2005; Buxbaum
et al., 2007; Frey, 2007) who have claimed that both the dorsal
and the ventral stream must play a role in the representation of
tools.
It would certainly be desirable, at the end of this sur-
vey, to predict (if we assume that a “strong version” of the
embodied cognition hypothesis is untenable), which are the
future directions of research that could more strongly support
the “domains of knowledge” or the “sensory-motor model of
conceptual knowledge” hypothesis. However, a deﬁnite choice
between “innatistic” and “experience dependent” mechanisms
can hardly be made, because both mechanisms certainly inter-
vene in the cognitive development. Coming back to the part
of this survey, in which I claimed that tool-related research
cannot be considered apart from investigations concerning in
general the brain categorical organization, I think that, in any
case, it should be important to more clearly assess: (a) if
in category-speciﬁc disorders the semantic impairment respects
or not the boundaries between biological entities and arti-
facts; (b) what is the role of the patient’s familiarity with
disrupted and spared categories, to see if this variable can
strongly inﬂuences the observed patterns of categorical semantic
impairment.
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